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The Modern Law of Trusts . Second Edition. By DAviD B . PARKER
and ANTHONY R. MELLOWS. London: Sweet and Maxwell.
1970 . Pp. xxx, 446. (No price given)
The continued existence of so many students' textbooks on the
law of trusts is one of the more remarkable features of law book
publishing in England. The appearance of new editions of the two
most recent publications is some indication that there is as yet no
glut on the market. One is probably justified in concluding that
each of the texts currently available and more or less up to date
has some desirable quality not to be found in the others . It would,
however, be a mistake to assume that the distinguishing charac-
teristic of the work under review is indicated by its title. The only
significant concessions to modernity to be found within its pages
are a preference for the latest available authorities and the now
almost compulsory references to the taxation of trusts . In all other
important respects the book is thoroughly traditional in its con-
ception and treatment of the subject.
Despite the short compilation of purposes for which trusts are
created and the passages devoted to taxation, the trust is treated
on the whole as a static rather than a functional concept and the
attention of the students who use the book will be directed mainly
at traps to be avoided in the course of its creation and administra-
tion. They will not learn when to use the concept; nor will they
receive much guidance as . to the considerations which affect the
choice of the terms or contents of the trust. This has been, of
course, the traditional approach but one had thought that the
number of law teachers who would defend it was steadily diminish-
ing and not only on this continent . No one can deny that there is
a place for practitioners' compendia of lawyers' and trustees' mis-
takes but it is more than a little depressing that this, the most
recent of the works written for students, keeps so close to the
traditional model. There is, to be sure, rather more discussion of
the principles behind the rules relating, for example, to semi-
secret trusts or to trusts of voluntary covenants than one would
expect to find in Lewin or even Snell but essentially the approach
is the same : irrespective of what we use it for or how we use it,
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the trust concept is to be studied in sterile isolation.
It is perhaps a trifle unfair to direct the above comments at a
book which gives rather more attention to the taxation of trusts
than was customary in the older English texts. It is doubtful,
however, whether there is much to be gained from the insertion of
short summaries of complex revenue provisions into texts which
are, in all other respects, constructed along the traditional lines.
Rather than more students' manuals on the law of trusts, what
would seem to be required both in England and in this country
are books and courses in estate planning or, at least, with a much
stronger planning emphasis . It is true that the trust is by no means
exclusively an estate planning device . It is still, however, pre-
dominantly this and it can be most valuably studied in its estate
planning context. The old view that "the three certainties", secret
trusts and the definition of charity have considerable "intellectual"
interest, but that the planning considerations which exercise the
time and mental equipment of practising lawyers have none, is
merely a comfortable prop for tired teachers .
If the general considerations are put on one side, it seems
clear that brevity and comparative simplicity are the main dis-
tinguishing attributes of the work . These qualities should not be
discounted . Parker and Mellows is neither as cryptic as Snell,' as
turgid as Pettit' nor as discursive as the new Hanbury. 3 As a short
precise account of the present state of the substantive law of trusts
in England it has considerable merit. In their preface to the second
edition the authors mention that the work has been found to be
useful to accountants and practitioners in other fields where
questions of law are never far removed. This one can understand.
Whether it is a suitable companion for law students at a university
is another matter . The brevity of the work is here something of a
drawback . The authors have attempted to do more than outline
the effect of the cases and statutory law in the area. Some attempt
is made to criticise particular decisions but when this is done it is
most frequently on the basis of inconsistency with other decisions
rather than by reference to basic principles or to functional and
policy considerations . The excessive positivism does, of course,
make the book particularly unsuitable for Canadian students . If
such students are to be encouraged to reject at least the notion
that decisions of English courts are necessarily the last word,
this book will not help . Decisions of the courts of other common
law countries are for the greater part ignored and the authors
show no sign of having benefited from the manful efforts of the
team responsible for the Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law.
I Snell's Principles of Equity (26th ed ., 1966) .z Equity and the Law of Trusts (2nd ed ., 1970) .
1 Hanbury's Modern Equity (9th ed ., 1969) .
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In this second edition, account has been taken of the most
recent English cases-up to and including the decision of the House
of Lords in McPhail v. Doulton 4 The authors incline to the view
that, in that case, the majority of the House of Lords extended
the principle of Re Gulbenkian's Settlement Trusts' to all trusts
and not merely to so-called "trust-powers" . Whether this is an
accurate prediction of the way in which the decision will be inter-
preted in cases in which trustees have no power to select the bene-
ficiaries may be doubted. Where there is a duty to distribute a fund
in fixed proportions among members of a class, something more
than the Gulbenkian test is required . This does not mean that it
is absolutely necessary to have a rule that each and every bene-
ficiary must be ascertainable . Where the criterion to be applied is
certain and the class is not so large as to make it unrealistic for
the trustees to endeavour to ascertain its members, it may not
matter that it is not possible to identify them all . It is undeniable
that this more flexible approach would create difficulties for
trustees in some cases. It may, however, be significant that in a
recent Canadian cases where such difficulties existed, no doubt
was cast on the validity of the trust.
A decision which has received some curious comments in
]English journals is that of Goflf J. in Re Denley's Trust Deed.'
It will be recalled that in that case the learned judge held that a
trust to maintain land as a sports ground for the benefit of em-
ployees of a company was valid . Although Parker and bellows
seem to approve of the policy behind the decision they, too, doubt
whether the approach of the learned judge was "correct in law" .
It is not uncommon for settlors and testators to attach specific
purposes to gifts and bequests made to identifiable beneficiaries .
A trust for the establishment of the settlor's children in a profes
sion or in business or for their general education is not void ; nor
is a testamentary trust which directs the trustees to publish the
testator's manuscripts or to continue his business, for the benefit
of specified individuals ; nor is an investment trust. Whythen should
it be suggested that a trust to maintain a sports ground for the
benefit of members of some other ascertainable class requires a
different treatment? The reason given by the authors is that
". . . if a provision is framed as a purpose, even though it is for
the benefit of individuals, it is the purpose which is the dominant
factor and if it is non-charitable it should fail unless it falls within
the recognized exceptions". This reasoning leads to a distinction
more devoid of substance than that which the House of Lords re-
'[19701 3 W.L.R. 1110 .
'[19701 A.C . 508.
s Re Allanson, [1971] 2 O.R . 279, rev. [1971] 3 O.R . 209 (C.A.) .7 119681 1 Ch. 373.
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jected in McPhail v. Doulton. The truth is that the rigid dichotomy
between trusts for persons and trusts for non-charitable purposes
is more the creation of academics than of the courts . The propo-
sition that, subject to exceptions and in the absence of any rele-
vant statutory provision, trusts for non-charitable purposes are
void may be a convenient way of summarising one line of cases
founded on the decision in Morice v. The Bishop of Durham' The
principle behind the proposition is, however, simply that ". . . a
trust by English law, not being a charitable trust, in order to be
effective, must have ascertained or ascertainable beneficiaries" .'
On that basis, the decision in Re Denley's Trust Deed cannot be
questioned .
Until the definitive Canadian text has been completed, law
teachers in this country have no choice but to recommend one
of the English books to their students . Professor Scott's treatise
has still no peer as a work of reference but, of course, its cost
places it far beyond the means of most students who wish to pur-
chase a text. Of the existing English books, Parker and Mellows
should not be ignored but, for the purposes of Canadian students,
it is, in the reviewer's opinion, more than overshadowed by the
new edition of Hanbury.
MAURICE C. CULLITY*
Casebook on Partnership. By E. R. HARDY IVAMY . Toronto :
Butterworths . 1970 . Pp . xiv, 114 . ($5 .80)
Casebook on Partnership is the latest of a great number of books
to flow from the prolific pen of Professor E. R. Hardy Ivamy in
recent years.' This casebook on partnership is, in the author's
own words "the first devoted entirely to the law of partnership".'
Partnership law is, in my opinion, a much neglected branch of the
law. It is the vehicle of operation utilized by most practically all
the professions' and a great number of businesses ; yet despite the
vast number of publications in other branches of the law, with
8 (1805), 10 Ves . 522.
9 Re Endacott, [19601 Ch . 232 (C.A.), at p . 246, per Evershed M.R .
*Maurice C . Cullity, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto .
I Cases on Carriage by Sea (1965) ; Cases on Sale of Goods (2nd ed.,
1969) ; Chalmer's Marine Insurance Act (6th ed ., 1966) ; General Principles
of Insurance (2nd ed., 1970) ; Fire and Motor Insurance (1968) ; Casebook
on Insurance (1969) ; Marine Insurance (1969) ; Topham and Ivamy's
Company Law (1970) .z Preface, p . v.
s Lawyers, doctors, dentists, architects, etc. are all required to exercise
their profession in the form of partnership rather than incorporated as-
sociations .
